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Abstract
We address the question of whether it is possible to operate a time ma-
chine by manipulating matter and energy so as to manufacture closed
timelike curves. This question has received a great deal of attention in
the physics literature, with attempts to prove no-go theorems based
on classical general relativity and various hybrid theories serving as
steps along the way towards quantum gravity. Despite the effort put
into these no-go theorems, there is no widely accepted definition of a
time machine. We explain the conundrum that must be faced in pro-
viding a satisfactory definition and propose a resolution. Roughly, we
require that all extensions of the time machine region contain closed
timelike curves; the actions of the time machine operator are then suf-
ficiently “potent” to guarantee that closed timelike curves appear. We
then review no-go theorems based on classical general relativity, semi-
classical quantum gravity, quantum field theory on curved spacetime,
and Euclidean quantum gravity. Our verdict on the question of our
title is that no result of sufficient generality to underwrite a confident
“yes” has been proven. Our review of the no-go results does, however,
highlight several foundational problems at the intersection of general
relativity and quantum physics that lend substance to the search for
an answer.
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1 Introduction
The twin topics of time travel and time machines continue to exert a hold
on the popular imagination. (Recent popularizations include the books by
Davies (2002), Gott (2001), and Randles (2005). The science section of the
New York Times occasionally runs articles on time travel and time machines;
see Overbye (2005).) The philosophical literature records a steady trickle and
occasional spikes of articles on the these topics. (Volume 88, number 3 of the
Monist (2005) is devoted to the topic of time travel.) And Visser (2003) esti-
mates that as of that date the physics literature contained over two hundred
articles on time travel and time machines, most of them of recent vintage.1
The popular literature can hardly be faulted for its simplifications and en-
thusiasms since its purpose is fire the imagination rather than dull it with
details and qualms. The philosophical literature, however, is another story.
It has focused in part on analyzing the “grandfather paradox” and related
issues. We find fault with this literature in that, first, it often fails to iden-
tify distinctive problems related to time travel, rather than re-packaging the
conflict between free will and determinism. Second, it is unclear what a time
traveller’s inability to kill Grandpa implies regarding the physical possibil-
ity or plausibility of time travel. There are certainly subtle and interesting
issues regarding modality here, but (as we hope to illustrate below) philoso-
phers have more to gain from a study of how time travel has been handled in
the physics literature than from continued analysis of the grandfather para-
dox.2In addition, philosophers have largely neglected the distinctive issues
raised by the physics literature on time machines. These issues are indepen-
dent of the time travel paradoxes since they are concerned with attempts
to establish–or evade–“no-go” results for time machines that focus on what
happens before closed timelike curves (CTCs) are formed. This is not to say
that the physics literature is unproblematic. For one thing, a reader will
search this literature in vain for a satisfactory definition of “time machine”
in terms of spacetime structure.3 For reasons to be explained below, this is
1There are also various works on time travel and time machines that lie somewhere
in between the popular science literature and the technical physics literature; see, for
example, Hawking et al. (2002) and Nahin (1999).
2A notable exception to our negative diagnosis of the philosophical literature is Arntze-
nius and Maudlin (2005).
3Our complaint is not that a “functional” definition is lacking – a TM is a device that
produces CTCs – but rather that there is not a standard definition of a TM in terms of
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less scandalous than it sounds. But there is obviously a task here that calls
for the kind of analysis that is stock-in-trade for philosophy.
The central issue to be discussed here can be simply, if crudely, posed:
Do the laws of physics allow the operation of a time machine, a device that
produces CTCs? If the answer is negative and the reasons have to do with
what happens before the CTCs are produced, then issues surrounding the
paradoxes of time travel do not have to be confronted. But any attempt
to give a positive answer cannot avoid taking a stance on these paradoxes.
Our stance, as explained in Section 2, is that these paradoxes are not genuine
antinomies but simply counterintuitive results that do not threaten either the
conceptual coherency or the physical possibility of time travel. At the same
time we try to diagnose why the air of paradox is so difficult to dispel. Section
3 surveys attempts to give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the
operation of time machines within the setting of relativistic spacetimes. We
reject various key conditions that appear frequently in the physics literature,
and we show why it is so difficult to specify an interesting sense in which
a device operating in a relativistic spacetime can be said to be responsible
for the development of CTCs. Although the most straightforward way of
cashing out “responsible for” is blocked, we introduce a “potency condition”
that we argue is the next best thing. The analysis in Section 3 deals with
how such responsibility can be cashed out exclusively in terms of the causal
structure of spacetime. The consequences of specific dynamical laws are
not considered until later sections, and various spacetimes are considered
in Section 3 that may not qualify as physically possible. But an analysis
at this general level has the distinct merit of being more fundamental and
thus applicable to all the different theories with all the different dynamics
discussed in the remaining sections of the paper. In the light of this discussion
and the potency condition we review in Sections 4-7 purported no-go results
for time machines, as well as more general “chronology protection” results,
that come from the classical general theory of relativity (GTR), semi-classical
quantum gravity, quantum field theory on curved spacetime, and Euclidean
quantum gravity.
Our discussion of these results is motivated by two more general philo-
sophical concerns, beyond their bearing on the question at hand. The first
is that delimiting the content of a theory involves judgments regarding what
spacetime structure, where the latter definition is needed to prove no-go theorems. Our
thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
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qualifies as “physically reasonable,” and the status of such judgments is a
more interesting issue than philosophers have generally realized. In this
case, the question is whether the vast array of spacetime structures allowed
in GTR can be trimmed down by considering solutions that correspond to
“reasonable” choices of physical fields populating spacetimes. We explore var-
ious ways of cashing out “reasonableness,” from imposing energy conditions
to formulating prerequisites a spacetime must satisfy to admit a quantum
field theory (QFT). Our second motivation for considering these results is
that they highlight the importance of “hybrid” theories and how they are
employed. The no-go results reviewed in Sections 5-7 all rely on different
combinations of QFT and GTR, none of which constitute a fully satisfactory
theory of quantum gravity. But physicists expect that exploring the no-go
theorems will allow them to probe the reliability of different parts of each
theory, and give some indication of what should carry over to a theory of
quantum gravity. Our conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2 Time travel and its paradoxes
We will not review here the various different senses of “time travel.”4 And
we will ignore those versions of time travel that exploit abnormal worldlines
in a spacetime that possesses a bland causal structure, such as Newtonian or
Minkowski spacetime. By an “abnormal worldline” we mean, for example, a
discontinuous world line that represents an observer who pops out of existence
in 2005 and then pops back into existence in 1492, or a continuous worldline
that bends backwards in time.5 We will be concerned exclusively with the
sense of time travel that uses worldlines that do not involve either of these
pathologies but which, nevertheless, are able to close on themselves because
they reside in a spacetime with an abnormal causal structure.
In more detail, we will be concerned with relativistic spacetimes, which
by definition consist of a differentiable manifold M and a Lorentz signature
metric gab defined on all of M. We are interested only in cases where the
spacetime M, gab is time orientable in the sense that it can be assigned a
globally consistent time direction. (Technically, this means that the space-
time admits a continuous non-vanishing timelike vector field, implying that
4See Earman (1995) and Earman and Wu¨thrich (2004) for taxonomies and further
discussion.
5Of course, the problem is to make sense of the “and then” and “bends backwards.”
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there is a continuous division of the lobes of the null cones into “future lobe”
and “past lobe.” This is a mild restriction since it can always be satisfied by
passing, if necessary, to a covering spacetime, as follows from the fact that
any simply connected spacetime is time orientable. Deciding which direction
of a time oriented spacetime deserves to be labeled “future” and which de-
serves to be labeled “past” is part of the problem of the direction of time,
which we do not try to tackle here.) By a wordline we mean a continuous
timelike curve which at each point is assigned a temporal orientation that
agrees with the time orientation of the spacetime in which it is embedded.
A CTC is then a closed worldline.
We are concerned here only with senses of time travel that can be ex-
plicated using CTCs. The fans of science fiction stories on time travel may
complain that our sense of time travel is a cheat since it implies ipso facto
that there is no normal time in which the time traveler can “go backward,” for
CTCs exist only for spacetimes that possess a globally consistent time direc-
tion but not a globally consistent time order.6 They may be able to introduce
some other notion of “time” such that travelling backwards makes sense in
special cases, such as asymptotically flat spacetimes. (These spacetimes ap-
proach flat Minkowski spacetime “far away ” from an isolated gravitational
source. The lack of a globally consistent time order does not rule out the ex-
istence of an “asymptotic time” defined in terms of the additional structure
of the asymptotic region.7) However, this strategy does not work in general,
and we will not discuss such time travel scenarios further. We acknowledge
this limitation of our approach, but we note that the trade-off for the loss
of contact with the science fiction literature is a gain in contact with the
6For p, q ∈ M, gab define p  q (p chronologically precedes q) to hold iff there is a
future directed timelike curve from p to q. This relation is always transitive. But it will
be irreflexive and anti-symmetric iff the spacetime does not contain CTCs.
7As an example of how a time travel scenario might work in such cases, consider a
Deutsch-Politzer gate, as illustrated in Figure 5a, assuming that this acausal region can
be embedded in an asymptotically flat spacetime. Our would-be time traveler could enter
the gate “just before it closes” (the hypersurface connecting p1 with p3) and emerge
from the “opening” of the gate (the hypersurface connecting p2 with p4) at an earlier
(asymptotic) time. Even in this example it is impossible to access asymptotic times prior
to the formation of the acausal region, ruling out some time travel scenarios. Furthermore,
“topological censorship” theorems due to Friedman, Schleich and Witt (1993) indicate
that (given various assumptions) any timelike curve that threads a region of complicated
topology cannot return to the asymptotic region; if these theorems can be extended to
non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes, they would rule out such a time travel scenario.
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theories of modern physics.
In any case, for us the question “Is time travel possible?” is equivalent to
the question of whether a spacetime structure containing CTCs is physically
possible. This issue can be given two senses, corresponding to a weak and a
strong sense of physical possibility. Time travel will be said to be physically
possible in the weak sense just in case the laws L (of the actual world) are
such that CTCs are compatible with L, or, in possible worlds talk, just in
case there is a possible world in which there are CTCs and in which L are
true. Time travel will be said to be physically possible in the strong sense just
in case the laws L (of the actual world) are such that there is a possible world
in which there are CTCs and in which L are not only true but are laws. If the
laws L are the laws of Einstein’s GTR, then time travel is physically possible
in the weak sense, for there are many known solutions to Einstein’s field
equations which satisfy various energy conditions,8 thought to be necessary
for physically realistic matter-energy sources, and which contain CTCs.
The issue of physical possibility in the strong sense is more delicate and
controversial because it turns on one’s conception of laws of nature. If, for
example, one wants an empiricist conception of laws on which the laws super-
vene on the occurrent regularities, then the weak sense of physical possibility
does not entail the strong sense since lawhood is not necessarily transmitted
down the chain of nomological accessibility. Consider, for sake of illustration,
David Lewis’s (1973) “best systems analysis” of laws,9 and suppose that the
best system for the actual world is axiomatized by the postulates of GTR.
There is no guarantee that these postulates will be among the axioms or the-
orems of the best system for a possible world that contains CTCs and that
satisfies these postulates. Nevertheless, we would be very surprised if there
were not some possible worlds that correspond to solutions to Einstein’s field
equations, that contain CTCs, and that return the laws of GTR when the
best systems analysis is applied to them. On other analyses of laws, such as
Carroll’s (1994), the present issue doesn’t arise since the weak sense of phys-
ical possibility entails the strong sense. The price to be paid for obtaining
this entailment is the failure of laws to be Humean supervenient, a price we
8These energy conditions will be discussed below in Section 4.
9Roughly, this view holds that the laws of a world W are given by the axioms or
theorems of the best deductive system for W . A deductive system for W is a deductively
closed axiomatizable set of sentences, all of which are true in W . The best such system is
the one that achieves the best compromise between strength (or information content) and
simplicity.
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think is too high; but that is a topic for another occasion.10
If it is so clear that time travel is physically possible in the weak sense and
(probably) also in the strong sense,11 what is one to make of the discussions
in the philosophical literature on the paradoxes of time travel, which are often
taken to threaten the conceptual coherency of time travel? The grandfather
paradox is a staple of these discussions – Kurt travels into his past, kills his
grandfather before granddad sires Kurt’s father, thus preventing Kurt from
making the journey. We view such paradoxes as a way of calling attention to
a phenomenon long known to physicists; namely, in the presence of CTCs,
consistency constraints can arise for local physics that would be absent in
spacetimes with a tame global causal structure.12 Familiar laws of relativis-
tic physics are typically stated in terms of local differential equations, and
as a result they have a global-to-local property. Treat a spacetime M, gab
as a fixed background on which a field Φ propagates. (Here “field” is to be
given a broad interpretation–it may be a scalar, vector, or tensor field, and
it may describe a system of discrete particles as opposed to a continuum
field.) The laws L governing Φ have the intended global-to-local property
iff for any global solution 〈M, gab,Φ〉 and any open neighborhood U ⊂M,
〈U , gab|U ,Φ|U〉 is also a solution. If the causal structure of the background
spacetime M, gab is tame one would expect that the field also has the op-
posite local-to-global property that any local solution 〈U , gab|U ,Φ|U〉 can be
extended to a global solution 〈M, gab,Φ〉. But when CTCs pass through U
(or more generally U is intersected repeatedly by a future directed timelike
curve) this local-to-global property can fail. A trivial but instructive illus-
tration is obtained by rolling up (1 + 1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime
along the time axis (see Fig. 1). Let U be a thin sandwich about the time
slice Σ. And consider on U a solution to the relativistic wave equation for a
scalar field Φ that corresponds to a single localized disturbance propagating
10A good overview of the different currently available accounts of laws of nature is found
in J. W. Carroll (2004).
11At least as far as the laws of classical GTR are concerned. Adding quantum considera-
tions may yield a different verdict. But the angst about the paradoxes of time travel that is
evident in the philosophical literature does not derive from worry about an incompatibility
of time travel with quantum physics.
12We should emphasize that we are interested only in consistency constraints entailed
by the combination of local physical laws and global spacetime structure, and not with a
broader notion of consistency (such as classifying initial data that lead to the formation
of a singularity as somehow “inconsistent”).
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Figure 1: (1+1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime rolled up along the time axis.
to the right.13 This local solution does not extend to any global solution
on the cylinder spacetime. If the spacetime of Fig. 1 is made into a donut
by identifying points of the space axis that are equal modulo pi, then the
only local solutions of the wave equation on any open U ⊂M that can be
extended to a global solution are the trivial ones, i.e. Φ = const.14
Both the philosophical and physics literature contain assertions to the
effect that there are no genuine paradoxes of time travel. If this is taken
to mean that the grandfather paradox and its ilk do not demonstrate that
time travel is logically, conceptually, or physically absurd, then we agree
wholeheartedly. For, to repeat, such paradoxes simply illustrate the presence
of consistency constraints on local physics in spacetimes with CTCs; and the
presence of such constraints do not show that CTCs are physically impossible
in either the strong or weak sense. But sometimes the assertion that there
are no genuine paradoxes of time travel is taken to mean that non-trivial
consistency constraints are absent (see, for example, Krasnikov 1997). In
unqualified terms, such assertions are patently false, as illustrated not only
by the above artificial example but by many other examples of self-interacting
and non-self-interacting fields on a variety of general relativistic spacetimes
with CTCs. There is, however, a qualified sense in which this assertion points
to an interesting truth.
Suppose that a spacetime M, gab contains a global time slice Σ (i.e., a
spacelike hypersurface with no edges).15 Irrespective of the global causal
13The wave equation states: ∇2Φ − ∂
2Φ
∂t2
= 0, where units have been chosen so that
c ≡ 1.
14It has been conjectured, but not proved, that a similar triviality result holds for Go¨del
spacetime which has the property that there is a CTC through every point.
15Some spacetimes, such as Go¨del spacetime, do not admit any global time slices. This
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structure of M, gab, the initial data on Σ for a relativistic field Φ may not
be freely specifiable but must satisfy a set of constraints C that follow from
the laws L(Φ) governing Φ. For example, the source-free Maxwell equa-
tions for the electromagnetic field entail that the electric and magnetic fields
at “time” Σ are divergence free; similarly, initial data for Einstein’s field
equations must satisfy a pair (or triple) of constraint equations. If Σ is inter-
sected more than once by future directed timelike curves, then consistency
with L(Φ) will typically entail additional constraints on initial data over and
above C. But suppose that Σ is achronal (i.e. is not intersected more than
once by a future directed timelike curve), in which case Σ is called a partial
Cauchy surface.16 Does the presence of a non-empty chronology violating re-
gion V ⊂M (consisting of all points p ∈M such that a CTC passes through
p)17 not intersecting Σ give rise to consistency constraints over and above C
in the sense that it is not true that, given any initial data on Σ satisfying C,
there is at least one solution of L(Φ) on all of M, gab that agrees with the
given data set on Σ?18 For fundamental fields–those which admit a well-posed
global initial value problem in Minkowski spacetime19–no counterexamples
are known to the conjecture that additional consistency constraints do not
arise. And a result of Krasnikov (2002), which will be discussed below, can
perhaps be adapted to prove this conjecture for a broad range of cases.
For future reference, however, note that a quantum mechanical treatment
of this issue may yield a different conclusion; indeed, there are a number of re-
sults to the effect that for interacting fields, unitarity fails for the chronology
violating region V to the future (or past) of Σ (see Boulware 1992; Friedman
et al. 1992; and Politzer 1992). There are various proposals for securing uni-
tarity (see Deutsch 1991; Deutsch and Lockwood 1994; Fewester and Wells
1995), but the security comes with a price tag. For example, Deutsch’s
is a consequence of three features: it is time orientable; a CTC passes through each point;
and it is simply connected. The edge of an achronal surface S is the set of points p such
that every open neighborhood O 3 p includes points in I+(p) and I−(p) that can be
connected by a timelike curve that does not cross S.
16If Σ is a global time slice of a spacetime M, gab then it will become a partial Cauchy
surface in an appropriate covering space time. For example, the time slice Σ of the
spacetime of Fig. 1 becomes a partial Cauchy surface when this spacetime is “unrolled”
to become Minkowski spacetime.
17If V 6= ∅ then it is an open region.
18Typically, if there is one such solution there will be many since the chronology violation
region V will lie beyond the domain of dependence of Σ, as discussed below.
19These include the Klein-Gordon field and the source-free Maxwell field.
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treatment uses the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics plus
the assignment of mixed rather than pure states to individual systems. We
will see below that quantum considerations provide the best hope for no-go
result for time machines.
Anticipating the discussion in the following section, our characterization
of time machines implies that there is a partial Cauchy surface on which the
operating instructions for the machine are specified. Thus, insofar as the
paradoxes of time travel are concerned with consistency constraints, “no-
go” results for time machines that depend only on what happens before the
formation of CTCs are independent of the paradoxes. However, a purported
“go” result would be tainted by the paradoxes – if they are indeed paradoxes,
rather than results that indicate a need to retrain our intuitions which are
tutored on cases without pathologies due to CTCs.
A diagnosis of one source of the lingering air of paradox can be gleaned
from the following quotation from a recent article in Physical Review D, a
leading physics journal:
Satisfactory physical theories must avoid giving rise to . . . self-
contradictory predictions. One approach to achieving this is to
impose consistency constraints on the allowable initial conditions
on spacelike surfaces prior to the formation of the CTCs, thus
abandoning the principle that initial conditions on such surfaces
can be chosen at will. For example, in the case of the grand-
father paradox we might insist on initial conditions just before
the prospective murder include the presence of a strategically
placed banana peel on which the prospective murderer slips as
he pulls the trigger, thus spoiling his aim. One might refer to
this approach as the ‘banana peel mechanism’. . . (Everett 2004,
p. 124023-1)
As the quotation indicates, the feeling of paradox arises from the conflict
between the notion that initial conditions ought to be freely specifiable and
the idea that highly contrived “banana peel mechanisms” have to be imposed
to avoid a self-contradictory result in the presence of CTCs.20
20This point has also been noted in the philosophical literature, and the need for “banana
peel mechanisms” has been used to argue for the improbability of time travel; see, e.g.,
Horwich (1987), and our response below.
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We advocate dispelling the air of paradox as follows. First, the notion
that initial conditions should be freely specifiable is simply wrong – as noted
above, even in the absence of global causal pathologies relativistic field equa-
tions may impose non-trivial constraints C on initial data. As for the addi-
tional constraints that arise when CTCs are present, no Cosmic Chaperone
is needed to make sure that they are in place, for these additional constraints
are entailed by the conjunction of the local laws governing the fields and the
global structure of the spacetime on which the fields are propagating. This
entailment arguably gives the additional constraints a lawlike status and, as
such, they arguably require no more explanation than do the constraints C.
A caveat is needed because there are distinctions between familiar constraints
and the constraints due to CTCs, emphasized by Arntzenius and Maudlin
(2005): the constraints imposed on data specified on a surface Σ due to the
presence of CTCs depends on the global structure of the spacetime and how
Σ is embedded within it. Although we will not argue the point here, our
position is that these differences do not undermine our claim that the “ba-
nana peel mechanisms” have the lawlike force of constraints. We endorse the
deflationary option that Everett offers when he concedes that the feeling that
initial conditions are freely specifiable and that banana peel mechanisms are
needed to avoid paradoxes “may simply reflect our lack of experience with
phenomena involving CTCs” (ibid.).
This discussion reveals a second, closely related source of the air of para-
dox about time travel; namely, since we typically assume a tame global space-
time structure, we naturally explicate the notion of what is physically possible
locally in time or spacetime as the compatibility of a local state of affairs with
the local laws of physics. That X is locally physically possible in this sense
normally guarantees that X is physically possible in-the-large, in that X
can be realized as part of a global scenario compatible with the same laws.
But when the background spacetime contains a V 6= ∅ the guarantee can
fail, since the local-to-global property described above may fail. When the
guarantee does fail one has the choice of modifying the explication of local
physical possibility to include a requirement of global realizability, or else of
canceling the expectation that being locally physically possible entails global
realizability. Taking spacetimes with CTCs seriously requires this “globaliza-
tion” of physical possibility, and the grandfather paradox and the like serve
to highlight this surprising consequence. It is (almost) universally agreed
that nothing illuminating comes from trying to promote the clash between
the special theory of relativity and intuitions about space and time that have
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been tutored by Newtonian physics into “paradoxes of relativity,” save when
these “paradoxes” are used as a pedagogical device to highlight some of the
differences between the old and the new theory. Our analysis of the time
travel paradoxes is similar: they highlight the contrast between the analysis
of physical possibility in a spacetime with tame global structure and in a
setting with CTCs.
Perhaps the paradoxes reveal something else entirely, namely that CTCs
are implausible or unlikely even if they are not logically or conceptually in-
coherent? This response grants our argument above, but then infers the
improbability of CTCs from the “bizarre” nature of such constraints (see,
e.g, Arntzenius and Maudlin 2005). The image of Kurt repeatedly slipping
on a banana peel as he tries to shoot Grandpa suggest that the constraints
would be strong enough to be immediately at odds with intuitive judgments
of local physical possibility. It is not yet known what form these constraints
will take for anything beyond simple toy models, and so it is unclear how
much we would be forced to revise our judgments regarding physical possibil-
ity. Although we do not have space to pursue the issue fully here, we see two
problems with arguments based on the “bizarre” nature of the constraints.
First, the constraints are relevantly similar to other constraints that are a
familiar and well-understood, if often overlooked, feature of relativistic field
equations. Pre-Maxwell physicists may have had intuitions regarding the as-
signments of electric and magnetic fields that conflicted with the constraint
equations, but in what sense would noting their “bizarre-ness” relative to pre-
theoretical intuitions be a revealing criticism of Maxwell’s theory? Second,
it is unclear what is meant by the claim that CTCs are “improbable.” This
could mean that the “best fit” model of GTR that describes that universe
or a subsystem of it probably does not include CTCs. It is not clear how
the existence of constraints would be relevant to assessing this probability, or
that the “bizarre nature” of constraints would trump other considerations.
On the other hand, the claim could instead be read as a negative assessment
of the subjective probability or degree of belief for the theory – namely, that
any theory allowing CTCs and bizarre constraints on initial conditions should
be assigned a low probability. Something like this second sense of “improba-
bility” may motivate physicists pursuing no-go theorems. But even if that is
the case there are other more compelling reasons to assign a low probability
to classical GTR, e.g., that it is incompatible with quantum theory.
Our deflationary resolution of the paradoxes of time travel has relied on
treating a spacetime with a chronology violating region as a fixed background
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on which test fields propagate. This treatment involves an idealization that
may be legitimate for some purposes, but strictly speaking it is inconsistent
with both the letter and spirit of GTR, which implies that the structure of
spacetime is not fixed but co-evolves with the matter-energy content accord-
ing to the coupled Einstein-matter field equations. It is, therefore, reasonable
to request that the above discussion be redone with the idealization removed.
Our response is to forthrightly admit that we cannot fulfill the request, and
then to say so much the worse for the paradoxes of time travel! The point is
that without the idealization that treats a spacetime with a chronology vio-
lating region as fixed background, it is difficult to make sense of the notion
of the consistency constraints that flow from the presence of CTCs. What
one wants to know is the answer to: What initial conditions for the coupled
Einstein-matter field equations, satisfying the constraints C appropriate for
these coupled equations, can be realized in a spacetime containing a chronol-
ogy violating region V 6= ∅ and displaying features ? Different ways of
filling the blank can produce radically different answers. The ambiguity is
removed when one works with a fixed spacetime background; for the filling
of the blank is automatically specified, and the answer to the question at
issue is entailed by the character of the solution set for the coupled Einstein-
matter field equations on the given background spacetime. But when the
fixed background is removed, there seems to be no principled way to fill the
blank, and the choice of filling is at the whim of pragmatic factors, such as
the type of time travel story one happens to be interested in at the moment.
Thus, to the extent that the legitimate interest of the so-called paradoxes of
time travel is captured by the issue of consistency constraints, that interest
drains away as the notion of consistency constraints turns to mush, as it
seems to when the idealization of a fixed spacetime background is removed.
3 Operating a time machine
That time travel is physically possible–in the sense that there are physically
possible worlds (in either the weak or strong sense) with CTCs–does not
necessarily mean that it is physically possible to operate a time machine.
Our goal in this section is to get a grip on what the operation of a time
machine would mean in terms of relativistic spacetime structure, over and
above the existence of CTCs.
Before starting on this task in earnest we should briefly explain our ap-
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proach and respond to a potential objection. Our aim is to clarify the sense
in which operation of a time machine can be said to “cause” or “produce”
CTCs. The nature of the problem disbars straightforward proposals, e.g.
that the specification of initial data for physical fields within a TM region
“produces” CTCs via dynamical evolution. This idea fails because the CTCs
necessarily fall outside the region of spacetime fixed via dynamical evolution
from the TM region, as we spell out below. In its place we propose a Potency
Condition, based on the intuition that although CTCs cannot lie within the
region causally determined by the TM region, they may be on the verge of
forming – in the sense that every possible extension of the TM region contains
CTCs. Throughout this discussion we characterize “causation” in terms of
spacetime structure. But perhaps this focus is too narrow, and there is some
perfectly legitimate sense in which a time machine “causes” the formation of
CTCs that our analysis doesn’t capture? To this objection our response is
simply to encourage the objector to explain this broader notion of “cause”
that we have failed to capture, and warn her of the challenge she faces. We
suspect that analyses of causation developed to handle ordinary cases of cau-
sation will not be of much use in considering time machines. Absent some
broader notion of causation applicable to this case, we proceed to use the
technical tools that do shed light on the nature of time machines.
Another aspect of our approach deserves comment: in this section we give
a definition of a TM, delaying the assessment of physical possibility until
later sections. The concepts of causal structure employed in the definition
are both more general and more fundamental than a particular choice of
field equations. They are a common ingredient of all the hybrids of quantum
theory and GTR discussed below, so our definition can be employed across
this range of cases. Admittedly, quantum gravity may someday reveal these
ideas are only approximations to some quite different underlying structure,
but that day is not yet here – so we continue to rely on them. Once we
have a grasp on the spacetime geometry of a TM, we consider whether such
a geometrical configuration falls within the space of physical possibilities
delimited by a given set of field equations.
Returning to our task, if the spacetimeM, gab is to accommodate a time
machine then it should be possible to choose a global slice Σ, corresponding to
a time before the time machine goes into operation, such that no CTCs exist
up to “time” Σ; for otherwise there would be no need for a time machine.
(Thus, Go¨del spacetime so beloved by philosophers who write on time travel,
is ruled out in the first instance as a time machine spacetime since it lacks a
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global slice.) Without much loss of generality, it can be assumed that Σ is a
partial Cauchy surface.21 Then the conditions that encode the instructions
for the operation of the time machine can be set on Σ. To assure that the
instructions are obeyed, the region of spacetime TM ⊂M corresponding
to the operation of the time machine should belong to the future domain of
dependence D+(Σ) of Σ. (D+(Σ) consists of all points p ∈M such that every
past intextendible causal curve through p intersects Σ. The past domain of
dependence D−(Σ) is defined analogously. Σ ⊂ M, gab is dubbed a Cauchy
surface if its total domain of dependence D(Σ) := D+(Σ) ∪D−(Σ) is M. A
spacetime that admits a Cauchy surface is said to be globally hyperbolic.22)
And whatever the details of its operation, a time machine is supposed to
be confined to a finite region of space and to operate for a finite amount of
time, implying that TM should have compact closure.23 And finally, to help
capture the idea that CTCs result from the operation of the time machine,
it should be the case that the chronology violating region V is contained in
the causal future J+(TM) of TM. (J+(S), S ⊂ M, is defined as the set
of all p ∈M such that p can be reached from S via a future directed causal
curve. The causal past J−(S) of a set S is defined analogously.)24 These
requirements are summarized schematically in Fig. 2.
This is very sketchy, but even without filling in the details two difficulties
should be apparent. The first is that no matter how this scenario is filled in,
it will not yield the kind of time travel beloved by science fiction writers, for
traveling from the “time” Σ into the causal past J−(Σ) of Σ is ruled out by the
set-up. The kind of time travel promoted by a time machine is thus confined
to the future of the “time” Σ. We see no way around this limitation as long
as time machines are to be implemented in orthodox relativistic spacetimes.
21Recall that if Σ is a global time slice for M, gab, then Σ can be turned into a partial
Cauchy surface by passing (if necessary) to a covering spacetime of M, gab.
22For the official definition of global hyperbolicity and a proof that a spacetime is globally
hyperbolic iff it admits a Cauchy surface, see Hawking and Ellis (1973, pp. 206-212).
For the hyperbolic field equations encountered in relativistic theories, there are typically
existence and uniqueness theorems that say in effect that appropriate initial conditions
on a partial Cauchy surface Σ uniquely determine a solution throughout the globally
hyperbolic region D(Σ).
23This rules out seeing Gott’s (1991) model as a time machine since it uses two infinitely
long cosmic strings.
24Thus, it is somewhat misleading to characterize no-go results as making “the uni-
verse safe for historians” (Hawking 1992a, p. 603) since the very set-up of the problem
automatically gives this safety.
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Figure 2: A spacetime containing a would-be time machine.
A second and much more serious difficulty lies in making sense of the
notion that CTCs are the “result of” the operation of the time machine. This
notion cannot be understood in the sense of causal determinism since V , if
it is non-null, always lies outside D+(TM) and, indeed, outside of D+(Σ).
Nor does it help to point to the stipulation that V ⊂ J+(TM), for while
that condition guarantees that every point in the chronology violating region
region can be causally influenced by the operation of the time machine, it does
not rule out the possibility that V is affected, perhaps decisively, by influences
not emanating from TM. Requiring that J−(V) ∩ Σ has compact closure
guarantees that any influences on the time travel region emanating from
Σ must originate from a finite portion thereof, which is certainly desirable
since conditions on Σ specify the operation of the time machine and such a
device is supposed to be finite. But again the trouble is that the condition in
question does not ensure that there aren’t other influences, perhaps decisive,
on V which originate from outside J−(V)∩Σ or even from outside of all of Σ.
The worry is illustrated by the simple but contrived example of Fig. 3. The
missing point p represents a singularity from which causal influences, not
determined by the conditions on Σ, can emerge and propagate to effect V ,
even though J−(V) ∩ Σ has compact closure. This trivial singularity can be
made irremovable, without changing the causal structure pictured in Fig. 3,
by replacing the original metric gab by φ
2gab where φ is a scalar field that
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J−(V) ∩ Σ
H+(Σ) H+(Σ)
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Figure 3: Influences coming from a singularity or from infinity.
goes to zero as the missing point is approached. Alternatively, if φ is chosen
to “blow up” as the missing point is approached, the singularity can be made
to disappear by pushing it off to infinity. But in that case V is subject to
influences coming from “infinity.”
Hawking (1992a) presumably had in mind these sorts of difficulties when
he imposed the requirement that the future Cauchy horizon H+(Σ) of Σ be
compactly generated (see also Hawking 1992b). H+(Σ) is the future boundary
of D+(Σ) (i.e. D+(Σ) − I−(D+(Σ)), where the overbar denotes topological
closure and I−(S), S ⊂M, is the chronological past of S consisting of all
points p such that there is a past directed timelike curve from S to p).
H+(Σ), which bounds the part of spacetime whose state can be causally
determined by conditions on Σ, is necessarily a null surface, and its generators
are null geodesics. If these generators, when traced far enough into the past,
fall into and remain in a compact set, then the Cauchy horizon is said to
be compactly generated. This requirement precludes the possibility of the
generators emerging from a curvature singularity or coming from infinity and,
thus, rules out the example of Fig. 3, whether or not it is doctored by the
addition of a conformal factor; for no neighborhood of the missing point p
has compact closure, and thus every past directed generator of H+(Σ) will
not remain trapped within a compact set.
It is not clear at the outset whether Hawking’s condition is either nec-
essary or sufficient for the operation of a time machine. As for necessity,
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it is true that a violation of Hawking’s condition opens the possibility that
the chronology violating region is affected by influences coming not from the
would-be time machine but from a singularity or from infinity; but it does
not follow that this is in fact the case.25 And as for sufficiency, it is not
at all obvious how, even in conjunction with the other restrictions imposed
above, the requirement that the chronology violating region is not affected by
influences coming from infinity or singularities ensures that the development
of CTCs is “due to” the operation of the would-be time machine.
One obvious and seemingly attractive way to obtain such an assurance
is to require that every suitable extension of D+(Σ) contains CTCs–call this
the Potency Condition for the would-be time machine.26 Satisfaction of the
Potency Condition would not guarantee that the details of the particular way
in which CTCs in fact developed are due to the operation of the would-be
time machine; but we know already that no condition can provide such a
guarantee, at least not via causal determinism. Satisfaction of the Potency
Condition would provide the next-best-thing by guaranteeing the develop-
ment of CTCs in some form or other. Of course, the condition as stated
remains a schema rather than a definite condition until “suitable extension”
is defined. At a minimum the extension should be smooth and maximal (i.e.
does not admit a proper extension). At the very least, any dynamical theory
will add as a condition the satisfaction of its dynamical equations. For rea-
sons given above, we do not impose any of these conditions just yet although
we recognize that ultimately, dynamical conditions must be included in an
assessment of physical possibility. We will get to the fate of time machines in
various dynamical theories in Sections 4-7. Here, we attempt to lay bare the
most fundamental causal spacetime structure that they all share. In general,
the more additional restrictions that are put on the allowed extensions, the
weaker the potency.
There is little hope, however, that the strongest form of the Potency
Condition is ever realized. To see the reason for the pessimism, consider the
case of Misner spacetime (see Fig. 4a), a two-dimensional spacetime which
captures some of the causal features of Taub-NUT spacetime, itself a ho-
mogeneous vacuum solution to Einstein’s field equations. Misner spacetime
is topologically S1x R. In the lower, or Taub region, the surfaces of homo-
25As was pointed out to us by Amos Ori.
26Or even more stringently that every suitable extension of D+(Σo), for some compact
Σo ⊂ Σ, contains CTCs.
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Figure 4: (a) Misner spacetime
geneity, such as Σ, are spacelike. But because the light cones “tip over,” the
surfaces of homogeneity eventually become more and more lightlike, until
eventually one reaches H+(Σ), which is not only compactly generated but
compact. If the Potency Condition is going to be satisfied in a strong form,
Misner spacetime would seem to be an ideal candidate; for H+(Σ) contains a
closed null curve (CNC), indicating that CTCs are on the verge of forming.
But not every smooth maximal extension of the D+(Σ) contains CTCs; nor
does every such extension have a compact or compactly generated H+(Σ)
containing CNCs. A smooth maximal extension sans CTCs and sans com-
pactly generated H+(Σ) can be constructed by cutting out vertical strips as
shown in Fig. 4b and slapping on appropriate conformal factors that preserve
the causal structure and ensure maximality by “blowing up” as the cut-out
regions are approached. Requiring that “suitable extensions” satisfy Ein-
stein’s field equations and standard energy conditions27 would presumably
disbar such constructions but would also, of course, weaken the potency.28
27These conditions, which will be discussed in the following section, rule out negative
energy densities and the like.
28Recall that our goal here is to offer a definition of a TM in terms of spacetime geometry
without assessing physical possiblity. Within the context of a particular theory, such as
classical GTR, it is natural to require that the extensions satisfy Einstein’s field equations
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Figure 4: (b) Misner spacetime with strips removed
However, even if the surgery-and-conformal-factor trick is disbarred, a
CTC-free maximal extension of the Taub region can still be constructed by
the alternative method of blocking CTC formation by first cutting out verti-
cal strips (as in Fig. 4a) and then ensuring maximality by taking the universal
covering spacetime of the surgically mutilated spacetime.29,30 To disbar such
artifices in a non-question begging fashion and to give the Potency Condi-
tion a fighting chance of being instantiated, we will impose Geroch’s (1977)
condition of hole freeness. A spacetime M, gab is said to be hole free just in
case for any spacelike Σ ⊂ M (not necessarily a global time slice) there is
and various energy conditions, and then attempt to prove no-go proofs; see Section 4.
29We are indebted to Robert Geroch for this example, as well as for the suggestion to
use the condition of hole freeness (see below), which was first introduced in Geroch (1977).
30Ori (2005) has described a time machine model for which he claims that every regular
extension beyond the Cauchy horizon includes a chronology violating region. The claim
seems plausible–if the sorts of tricks we are discussing are disbarred. Ori (2007) appeals
to a condition similar to our Potency Condition in order to capture the notion that the
formation of CTCs is “triggered by” the initial conditions on (see 044022-3). Our Potency
Condition was originally proposed in the pre-print “Take a Ride on a Time Machine”
posted to the PhilSciArchive in 2003 and in revised form on 19 March 2004 (see phils-
ciarchive.pitt.edu/archive/00001673). Since then this condition has appeared in various
guises in the physics literature on time machines.
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no isometric imbedding ι : D(Σ) → M′ into a spacetime M′, g′ab such that
ι(D(Σ)) is a proper subset of D(ι(Σ)).31 That it is not question begging
to require hole freeness in the present context follows from two considera-
tions. First, we are seeking, so to speak, the next best thing to the notion
that the operation of the would-be time machine causally determines that
CTCs emerge. And, second, causal determinism itself has no prayer of being
satisfied unless hole freeness is required (see Earman 1995, Sec. 3.8).
With this understanding, our proposed version of the strongest form of the
Potency Condition requires that every extension of D+(Σ) contains CTCs if
it is smooth and hole free. Manchak (2007) has very recently proven that Mis-
ner spacetime satisfies a slightly modified version of the strongest Potency
Condition in which it is required that that the closure of D+(Σ) be hole
free.32 If the class of spacetimes satisfying this form of the condition should
31In defining the domain of dependence D(Σ) of Σ it is typically assumed (if only
implicitly) that Σ is achronal. Since we are applying the notion of hole freeness to possibly
acausal spacetimes, we cannot make this assumption. Thus, D(Σ) is to be understood to
consist of all points p such that every inextendible causal curve through p meets Σ at least
once (and possibly many times). As far as we can tell, this understanding leads to no
counterintuitive consequences. But if this is incorrect, the definition of hole freeness can
be modified as follows: M, gab is counted as hole free just in case for any open U ⊂ M
and any achronal spacelike Σ of the spacetime U , gab|U there is no isometric imbedding
ι : D(Σ)→ U ′ into a spacetime U ′, g′ab such that ι(Σ) is achronal and ι(D(Σ)) is a proper
subset of D(ι(Σ)).
32In fact, he prefers a slightly modified definition of “future domain of dependence”
according to which D+(Σ) consists of all points in M from which every past-directed,
inextendible timelike curve intersects Σ. In this case, he shows, Misner spacetime satisfies
the Potency Condition even without imposing hole freeness. The extensions must only
be maximal and smooth. The standard definition of D+(Σ) which we use here, can
be found in Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 201) and Wald (1984, p. 200). Geroch (1970)
originally introduced the notion using “timelike curve” instead of “causal curve” as is
now standard. The resulting future domains of dependence differ insofar as the standard
domain is a proper subset of the non-standard domain a` la Geroch: the latter, but not
the former includes the boundary points of D+(Σ). Manchak shows that the adoption of
Geroch’s original definition can be exploited to show that surgery on Misner spacetime as
performed in Fig. 4b cannot preclude the emergence of CTCs in all maximal extensions
of D+(Σ). The removed stripes in Fig. 4b cut all the way into H+(Σ). This is no longer
permissible under Geroch’s definition because it includes the Cauchy horizon H+(Σ) in
D+(Σ). Manchak shows that smoothly extending this non-standard future domain of
dependence of Misner spacetime will always allow just enough of a window for CTCs to
slip through below the cut. We reject this alternative conception of D+(Σ) because it
would allow causal signals that have not emanated from the time slice under consideration
to reach points in the future domain of dependence. But this would frustrate our attempts
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prove to be empty with the exception of Misner spacetime, the potency can
be weakened by requiring in addition that extensions satisfy Einstein’s field
equations and energy conditions, or field equations derived from a proposed
theory of quantum gravity. Thus, a hierarchy of Potency Conditions of de-
creasing strength emerges, indexed according to the theory used to delimit
the physically possible extensions, with a correspondingly growing class of
spacetimes satisfying the conditions.
To see the bite of the Potency Condition, consider a proposal of Krasnikov
(1998) for defining relativistic time machines.
Definition. Let M, gab be an inextendible spacetime with a non-
null chronology violating region V . K ⊂M is said to be a Kras-
nikov time machine iff (i) V ⊂ K and (ii)M−J+(K) is isometric
to a region M′ − J+(K′) of a spacetime M′, g′ab that does not
contain CTCs and K′ ⊂M′ is compact.
Krasnikov (1998) constructs a spacetime which contains a time machine in
this sense, which is singularity free, and which satisfies the weak energy con-
dition (the significance of this condition is discussed in the following section).
The construction proceeds in two steps. First, construct a Politzer spacetime
(see Fig. 5a) by deleting the points p1 − p4 from Minkowski spacetime and
then gluing together the strips as shown. Because of the missing points the
spacetime is singular in the sense of geodesic incompleteness.33 This is taken
care of in the second step. The introduction of an appropriate conformal
factor leaves the causal structure the same but makes the spacetime geodesi-
cally complete (and, indeed, b-complete34) without violating the weak energy
condition.
at offering the strongest possible sense in which the CTCs are due to the operation of the
potential time machine. As a consequence of our rejection of the alternative conception
of D+(Σ), hole freeness must be used to obtain the result that Misner spacetime satisfies
the Potency Condition, which is not necessary on the alternative conception as shown by
Manchak. For the proof to go through, one does not need to require hole freeness of the
entire maximal extension of D+(Σ), but only of the closure of D+(Σ). We maintain that
the stronger demand of hole freeness for the entire maximal extension is still preferable
since we want to rule out in general artifical cutting strategies attempting to foil the
formation of CTCs, as exemplified in Figure 4a. If CTCs fail to occur, it should be for a
better reason than God using his scissors to cut the CTCs.
33A spacetime is geodesically complete just in case every geodesic can be extended to
arbitrarily large values of one of its affine parameters.
34b-completeness is stronger than geodesic completeness. For a definition of b-
completeness see Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 259).
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Figure 5: (a) Politzer spacetime
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Figure 5: (b) Minkowski spacetime
The Def. is satisfied if K is chosen to be the causal future of the shaded
rectangle shown in Fig. 5a and K′ is chosen to be the shaded region of
Minkowski spacetime shown in Fig. 5b. But this reveals the defect of
the definition: there is no separation between the operation of the supposed
time machine and the CTCs it is supposed to produce. To overcome this
defect one could modify the Def. to require that V ⊂ J+(K) and that K, like
K′, has compact closure. The modified definition is satisfied if K is chosen
to be the shaded rectangle in Fig. 5a rather than its causal future. But now
another glaring defect emerges: there is no reasonable sense in which this
new K corresponds to the operation of a time machine. Up to “time” Σ′,
which is after the alleged time machine has operated, the Politzer spacetime
and the corresponding portion of Minkowski spacetime (Fig. 5b) are isomet-
ric. So there is no reasonable sense in which the CTCs in Politzer spacetime
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are “due to” the conditions in the time machine region K–or for that mat-
ter to the entirety of the conditions prior to Σ′, which may be chosen to lie
as close to the chronology violating region V as desired. For no interesting
form of the Potency Condition is fulfilled in this case since there are exten-
sions beyond Σ′–e.g. to Minkowski spacetime–which do not contain CTCs
but which satisfy every condition that could be reasonably demanded of a
suitable extension.
If the Potency Condition is accepted as the key to seeing a time machine
at work, then one could seek to motivate Hawking’s condition of compactly
generated future Cauchy horizon by proving a form of the conjecture that,
in some broad and interesting class of spacetimes, when H+(Σ) is compactly
generated, the Potency Condition is realized for D+(Σ). The seeming plau-
sibility of such a conjecture follows from the fact that strong causality is
violated in a neighborhood of H+(Σ) if it is compactly generated.35 (Strong
causality is violated at a point p if, intuitively, there are almost closed causal
curves near p; more precisely, there is a neighborhood of p such that every
subneighborhood has the property that some causal curve intersects it more
than once.) This violation can be taken as an indication that the seeds of
acausality have been planted in D+(Σ) and are ready to bloom in the form
of CTCs in any non-artificially constructed maximal extension. But to the
extent that the Potency Condition can be satisfied in the absence of a com-
pactly generated Cauchy horizon, Hawking’s condition cannot be counted as
a necessary condition for the operation of a time machine.
At first blush the suggested approach to identifying the operation of a
time machine by means of the Potency Condition is threatened by a result of
Krasnikov (2002) showing that every time oriented spacetime M, gab with-
out CTCs has as an extension a maximal time oriented spacetime such that
any CTC in the extension lies to the chronological past of the image of M
in the extension. Furthermore, the construction allows local conditions on
the metric, such as Einstein’s field equations and energy conditions, to be
carried over to the maximal extension. But at second glance, it is not at all
obvious that Krasnikov’s construction guarantees that his maximal exten-
sion will satisfy our preferred form of the Potency Condition that includes
a hole freeness restriction on extensions. And the result of Manchak (2007)
35This follows from the result that the generators of H+(Σ) for a partial Cauchy surface
Σ are past endless. If H+(Σ) is compactly generated, we thus have a past endless causal
curve totally imprisoned in a compact set, and thus by Prop. 6.4.7 of Hawking and Ellis
(1973, p. 195) strong causality fails in this set.
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mentioned above indicates that the Potency Condition in our preferred form
is not empty.
In the next section we start to include among the requirements asked
of suitable extensions H+(Σ) various constraints based on dynamics. But
before turning to this task we want to acknowledge an alternative approach.
Our method of specifying what it means for a would-be time machine to be
“responsible for” the formation of CTCs appeals to features of the causal
structure of the spacetimes of classical GTR. Alternatively, one could try to
cash out “responsible for” using one or another of the analyses of causation
available in the philosophical literature. The three leading analyses are (i)
interventionist, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) probabilistic. The first seems
inappropriate when the system at issue is the entire cosmos. The second
and third require an apparatus that is not provided by GTR itself — in
the case of (ii) a nearness relation on the possible worlds (here, solutions to
Einsteins field equations) and in the case of (iii) a probability measure over
these worlds. Providing such an apparatus and discussing its implications for
time machines is a worthy enterprise. But it is not one that we will pursue
here since it quickly loses contact with the physics literature and threatens to
mire the discussion of time machines in the endless controversies that swirl
around the cause-effect relation.
4 Chronology protection and no-go results for
time machines in classical GTR
The absence of a satisfactory analysis of “time machine” in the sizable and
ever growing physics literature on this topic is less scandalous than it might
seem at first impression, at least for that portion of the literature that aims at
no-go results; for the authors of these results don’t have to offer an analysis
but only necessary conditions for the operation of a time machine. Our
complaint about this literature does not derive from the lack of a general
analysis but from the fact that a scrutiny of the proffered necessary conditions
often reveals a dubious quality that undermines the forces of the no-go result.
The program of producing no-go results for time machines can be seen as
part of the more ambitious program of producing chronology protection the-
orems that take the form: “If no CTCs are present to begin with, then CTCs
cannot emerge without violating conditions ,” where the conditions that
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go into the blank are to be justified on the grounds that they must be satis-
fied in any physically reasonable model of GTR. (Hawking’s original version
of the chronology protection conjecture stated that: “The laws of physics do
not allow the appearance of closed timelike curves” (1992a, p. 603).) Estab-
lishing that CTCs cannot be manufactured by time machines would go part
way–but only part way–towards establishing chronology protection. In the
other direction, a strong chronology protection theorem would put the time
machine industry out of business without having to settle on necessary and
sufficient conditions for a time machine. In turn, the program of establishing
chronology protection can be seen as part of the still more ambitious pro-
gram of establishing a strong version of cosmic censorship, which militates
against the formation of “naked singularities” in the form of any pathology
that would undermine global hyperbolicity (see Penrose (1998)).
In preparation for the discussion of chronology protection results, we will
comment briefly on the role of energy conditions. Einstein’s field equations
set the Einstein tensor Gab, which is computed from the metric gab and its
derivatives, proportional to the stress-energy tensor Tab, which describes the
distribution of matter-energy. Save for the vacuum case (Tab ≡ 0) the impo-
sition of Einstein’s field equations has no bite unless restrictions are put on
possible values for Tab; for given any smooth metric gab, Einstein’s equations
are satisfied for the Tab simply set equal to Gab/8pi (in geometrical units,
where G = c = 1). The field equations do have considerable bite when con-
joined with the requirement that Tab must arise from known matter fields.
But adopting this requirement would mean that chronology protection theo-
rems could not have the ambition of showing that chronology is protected for
as yet unknown but physically reasonable fields. For this reason chronology
protection theorems adopt instead one or another condition on Tab thought
to hold for most, if not all, physically reasonable fields.
The most widely cited of these conditions is called the weak energy condi-
tion (WEC), which says intuitively that there are no negative energy densi-
ties. The technical statement is that TabV
aV b ≥ 0 for any timelike V a. For a
perfect fluid with density µ and pressure p this is equivalent to requiring µ ≥ 0
and µ + p ≥ 0. The strong energy condition (SEC) which, despite what its
name suggests, does not entail the WEC, requires that TabV
aV b ≥ 1
2
Tr(Tab)
for every unit timelike V a. The dominant energy condition (DEC) says in-
tuitively that the energy-momentum flow as measured by any observer is
non-spacelike. Technically the condition is that for any future-directed time-
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like V a, −TabV a is a future-directed null or timelike vector.36
Satisfaction of these energy conditions is sometimes taken as the defin-
ing feature of physically reasonable matter. But these conditions are not
sacrosanct; they can fail to hold for quantum fields, and recently physicists
have contemplated matter sources violating one or more of the energy condi-
tions. To take a recent example, in standard Friedmann-Robertson-Walker
cosmological models the expansion of the universe decelerates if the matter
sources satisfy the WEC and the SEC.37 To capture the observed accelerated
expansion in these models, there must be a form of matter, “dark energy,”
violating the SEC.38 One candidate for the dark energy called “phantom
matter” violates all three of the above energy conditions. It has been sug-
gested that such matter could be used to produce traversable wormholes and
thence CTCs (see Lobo 2005); but because the violation of the DEC by such
matter opens to door to acausal propagation, it is not clear how seriously
the suggestion should be taken.
Early no-go results for time machines were proved by Tipler (1976, 1977).
His results showed that the evolution of CTCs from regular initial data on an
asymptotically flat partial Cauchy surface would, under certain conditions,
lead to a violation of the conjunction of the Einstein field equations and the
WEC, or else would cause spacetime singularities to form. Thus, if to “man-
ufacture” CTCs means “construct using only ordinary matter everywhere”
and “ordinary matter” satisfies the WEC and does not reach arbitrarily great
densities, then the theorems do count as no-go results for time machines. Or
at least they would if the sense of “singularity” used in the proof of the
theorems–namely, geodesic completeness–entailed the existence of arbitrar-
ily large matter densities; but this entailment is not universal. In particular
it fails to hold for typical time machine models, in which the presence of
an incomplete null geodesic does not signal divergent matter densities.39 A
second and more important limitation (noted by Ori 1993) is that Tipler’s
theorems do not contain any information about when the singularities form;
if they do not form prior to the emergence of CTCs, then even if they do
36The minus sign is a result of our choice of signature (+++−) for the spacetime metric.
37More precisely, a¨ < 0 if the WEC and SEC are satisfied, where a(t) is the scale factor
in the FRW models.
38For a review of the dark energy problem, see S. Carroll (2004).
39For example, Hawking (1992a) discusses a time machine model including a “fountain”
of the compactly generated Cauchy horizon, an incomplete null geodesic, which is not
associated with divergent energy densities.
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entail unbounded matter densities they cannot serve as an explanation of
why CTCs cannot be manufactured from ordinary matter.
The next significant chronology protection result was due to Stephen
Hawking. If Σ is a partial Cauchy surface and H+(Σ) is compact, then Σ
must be compact (Hawking 1992a and Chrusciel and Isenberg 1993). This is
a purely geometrical result.40 Thus, whether or not Einstein’s field equations
or energy conditions hold, if Σ is non-compact (i.e. the universe is spatially
open), then H+(Σ) is non-compact. But can H+(Σ) nevertheless be com-
pactly generated when Σ is non-compact? Hawking (1992a) showed that the
answer is no under plausible assumptions. Specifically, he proved that if Σ
is non-compact and if Einstein’s field equations and the WEC are satisfied,
then H+(Σ) cannot be compactly generated.
How effective is Hawking’s result in protecting chronology? The first
comment is that the WEC is not absolutely sacred even in classical GTR.
Vollick (1997) has shown how the WEC can be violated using a charged
dust interacting with a scalar field. Although the dust and the scalar field
separately have positive energy densities, the interaction part of the stress-
energy tensor can have negative energy densities. Using this fact, Vollick
showed that it is possible to build a sphere of charged dust with negative
energy density throughout the interior.41
But apart from doubts about the WEC, the crucial issue is whether the
condition of compactly generated Cauchy horizons can be justified as a nec-
essary condition for the operation of a time machine since it certainly cannot
be justified as a condition that any physically reasonable model of GTR must
fulfill. By our lights the justification would have to proceed by showing that
when H+(Σ) is not compactly generated, a strong and interesting form of
40Assuming that the spacetime is time orientable, there always exists a continuous non-
vanishing timelike vector field. Using the integral curves of this vector field, map the points
of H+(Σ) into the interior D+(Σ). This mapping is one-to-one and onto. Thus, if H+(Σ)
is compact, so is the resulting surface. In addition, the resulting surface is spacelike and
diffeomorphic to Σ.
41Vollick shows that for a sphere of charged particles coupled to a scalar field, T44 < 0
in the interior of a sphere provided that
(
α
m
)2
µoR
2 > 2, where α is the coupling constant
between matter and the scalar field, µo is the rest mass density, and R is the radius of the
sphere. Although this violation of the weak energy condition is achieved without recourse
to zero-point energies and other subtleties of quantum field theory, the scalar field must
be very strongly coupled to matter over large distances. We take the existence of such a
scalar field to be physically implausible.
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the Potency Condition necessarily fails. This seems implausible, for there is
no evident reason why, in the generic case of a four-dimensional inhomoge-
neous spacetime, it cannot happen that the behavior of the metric in one
region of D+(Σ) implies that all smooth hole free extensions that satisfy
Einstein’s field equations and energy conditions contain CTCs, while overall
the behavior of the metric implies that H+(Σ) is not compactly generated
in some or all such extensions (because, for example, curvature singularities
develop in other regions).42 Of course, this objection falls flat if our preferred
version of the Potency Condition cannot be satisfied for the class of models
being considered. But in that case the issue of whether Hawking’s condition
of compactly generated Cauchy horizons is necessary for the operation of a
time machine is moot since it is unclear how to characterize a time machine
for the class of models under consideration.
Hawking’s theorem does not apply when the partial Cauchy surface Σ is
compact, for otherwise Taub-NUT spacetime and Misner spacetime would be
counterexamples. To attempt to fill the gap, one can bring to bear Theorem
3 of Tipler (1977). The proof of this theorem can be adapted to show that
if the WEC and Einstein’s field equations hold and if the generic condition
holds somewhere on H+(Σ) (6= ∅), then H+(Σ) is not compactly generated.
Taub-NUT spacetime and Misner spacetime are not counterexamples because
they violate the generic condition which requires that V aV bV[cRd]ab[eVf ] = 0,
where Rabcd is the Riemann tensor and V
a is the tangent to a timelike or null
geodesic. The generic condition entails that all geodesics feel a tidal force.
The absence of such a force on all of H+(Σ) would signal that the spacetime
is of a rather “special” character.43 But then no one thought that spacetimes
implementing time machines would be generic. One expects more from a no-
go result than a statement of the form: a time machine can operate only
under such-and-such and such special conditions.
Hawking (1992a) attempted to fill the gap in another way. When Σ is
compact, H+(Σ) can be compactly generated. But if it is, both the conver-
gence and shear of the null geodesic generators of H+(Σ) must vanish if the
42Doubts about Hawking’s condition of compactly generated Cauchy horizon as a sine
qua non for time machines have also been expressed by Ori (1993) and Krasnikov (1999).
43There are other results which further suggest that a time machine spacetime must
be “special.” For example, Isenberg and Montcrief (1985) considered analytic vacuum and
electrovacuum solutions to EFE which contain a compact null hypersurface ruled by closed
null geodesics. They showed that such spacetimes must be special in the sense that they
possess a Killing symmetry.
29
WEC holds. “This would mean,” Hawking wrote, “that no matter or infor-
mation, and in particular no observers, could cross the Cauchy horizon into
the region of closed timelike curves” (p. 606). But this implication doesn’t
constitute an anti-time machine result per se; it says rather that the operator
of the time machine cannot take advantage of his handiwork.
Two further results deserve brief mention. Maeda et al. (1998) prove that
there is no maximal spacetime containing a non-empty chronology violating
set V if a number of conditions are satisfied. The theorem is self-consciously
styled as a no-go result for time machines, but as such it is aimed mainly
at finitely vicious spacetimes (where V is contained in a compact set) that
arise from the sorts of identifications made in the construction of Politzer
spacetime. We argued in the preceding section that Politzer spacetime is not
a plausible candidate for a time machine spacetime, so this theorem does not
recommend itself as a general chronology protection theorem. Another recent
no-go result operates against the possibility of producing CTCs by means
of traversable wormholes: Hochberg and Visser (1997, 1999) establish the
violation of energy conditions at or near the throats of traversable wormholes.
In sum, while the various theorems reviewed above that have been adver-
tised as no-go results for time machines or as chronology protection theorems
for classical GTR do indicate that there are problematic aspects to imple-
menting a time machine in this context, they do not justify the gloss that
the laws of classical GTR forbid the operation of a time machine.
5 No-go results using semi-classical quantum
gravity
The introduction of quantum considerations cuts in two directions with re-
spect to proving chronology protection results and/or no-go results for time
machines: in one direction the quantum would appear to undermine the clas-
sical no-go results since quantum fields can, for example, violate the WEC
assumed in many of these results;44 but in the other direction the quantum
introduces new mechanisms that may prevent the formation of CTCs. In
44However, Ford and Roman (1996) argue that “quantum inequalities” place limitations
on the violation of the weak energy condition and that in turn these limitations constrain
the geometry of traversable wormholes that might allow CTCs. For a review of more
recent results along these lines see Fewster (2005).
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this section we study one such mechanism which arises in the context of
semi-classical quantum gravity (SCQG).
The ambitions of SCQG do not extend to quantizing the metric; rather
the aim is to estimate how quantum fields affect the metric by computing
the quantum expectation value 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 of the (renormalized) stress-energy
tensor Tab that arises from the quantum fields, and then by inserting this ex-
pression into Einstein’s field equations in place of the classical stress-energy
tensor in order to calculate the “backreaction” of the fields on the metric.
Work by Frolov (1991) and Kim and Thorne (1991) suggested that for phys-
ically interesting states |ξ〉 of linear quantum fields, 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 diverges as the
Cauchy horizon H+(Σ) is approached in classical general relativistic space-
times where CTCs occur to the future of H+(Σ). Hawking (1992a) argued
that when the backreaction has an attractive gravitational effect, the diver-
gence behavior would cause the formation of singularities along H+(Σ), cut-
ting off future development of the spacetime, whereas when the backreaction
has a repulsive gravitational effect “the spacetime will resist being warped
so that closed timelike curves appear” (p. 610); either way, the mechanism
of SCQG acts to prevent the formation of CTCs. Hawking’s argument has
not been made rigorous; indeed, it cannot be made rigorous in our present
state of knowledge since, presumably, the details will depend on the presently
non-existent quantum theory of gravity.
Basing a no-go theorem on the divergence of 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 faces a more imme-
diate obstacle: in some cases there is no divergence! Krasnikov (1996) and
Sushkov (1997) studied some toy models with CTCs and a partial Cauchy
surface Σ and exhibited states |ξ〉 for which 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 remains bounded as
H+(Σ) is approached.45 The “Sushkov state” is not entirely well behaved
since the expectation values of other field quantities diverge as the Cauchy
horizon is approached. If anything, these results show that one can cir-
cumvent the heuristic arguments for the divergence of 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 by cleverly
choosing the field and/or the spacetime.46 A general problem with these
45Sushkov (1997) proved that for an automorphic quantum field (characterized as a
complex scalar field ϕ in an external electromagnetic field) in four-dimensional Misner
space, carefully setting the automorphic parameter yields a field such that 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 is zero
everywhere on the initially globally hyperbolic region D+(Σ). An automorphic field at a
point x satisfies the following condition: ϕ(Lx) = exp(2piiα)ϕ(x), where L is an element
of the spacetime isometry group and 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 is the automorphic parameter.
46Hiscock (2000) has rejected these and other purported counterexamples to Hawking’s
chronology protection conjecture on the grounds that they either rely on special properties
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results is that even if there is a well-defined limit of 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 as the horizon
is approached, the value of 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 on the horizon may still be singular.
In the Sushkov state the renormalized stress energy tensor vanishes on the
initially globally hyperbolic region, but it vanishes on the Cauchy horizon as
well only if continuity holds (see Cramer and Kay 1996). A result due to Kay,
Radzikowski, and Wald (1997) (hereafter, KRW) shows that continuity nec-
essarily fails: 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 cannot be non-singular on all of H+(Σ) when H+(Σ)
is compactly generated.47 In any case, physicists gave up on the idea that
the “blow up” of 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 at the chronology horizon provides a mechanism
for chronology protection.
Rather than focusing on the behavior of field properties as H+(Σ) is
approached, KRW prove that the formation of CTCs undermines the appli-
cability of SCQG. Understanding their result requires a brief review of the
“point-splitting prescription” for evaluating 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 (see Wald 1994, Ch. 4
and KRW). The stress energy tensor for a scalar field ϕ typically includes
ϕ2 terms.48 There is no natural way to define a product of distributions
at a single point. As the name suggests, in point-splitting the product is
treated as the coincidence limit of a bidistribution defined over two points,
e.g. 〈ξ|ϕ2(x)|ξ〉 := limx→x′ [〈ξ|ϕ(x)ϕ(x′)|ξ〉 −H(x, x′)]. H(x, x′) corresponds
to “vacuum stress-energy” and it is subtracted to get rid of possible diver-
gences. The quantity in square brackets is a smooth, well-defined function of
x and x′ only if the two terms have the same short range singularity behavior.
In Minkowski spacetime H(x, x′) for the preferred vacuum state is singular
if and only if the points (x, x′) are null related. So the procedure yields a
well-defined quantity 〈ξ|ϕ2(x)|ξ〉 if 〈ξ|ϕ(x)ϕ(x′)|ξ〉 is required to have the
same singular behavior as H(x, x′).
Generalizing this approach to curved spacetimes leads to the requirement
that physically admissible states satisfy what is called the Hadamard condi-
tion. Curved spacetimes lack a preferred global vacuum state, so to apply the
of the quantum fields or else they depend on “fine tuning” the metric parameters. In a
similar vein, purported counterexamples to Roger Penrose’s cosmic censorship hypothesis
have been rejected on the grounds that they are highly non-generic.
47Cramer and Kay (1996) generalize the KRW result slightly to cover Sushkov’s ex-
ample; H+(Σ) is not compactly generated in four-dimensional Misner spacetime consid-
ered by Sushkov, but the KRW result applies to any manifold which is the product of
an n-dimensional spacetime with a compactly generated Cauchy horizon and a (4 − n)-
dimensional Riemannian manifold.
48For a Klein-Gordon field, for example, Tab = ∇aϕ∇bϕ− 12gab(∇c∇cϕ+m2ϕ2).
32
point-splitting prescription one needs to determine the properties of H(x, x′).
As Wald (1994) shows, specifying four desirable properties for 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 leads
to constraints on H(x, x′); roughly, the upshot is that H(x, x′) is singular
for null-related points but well-defined for other points (it is “locally weakly
Hadamard”). The Hadamard condition limits physically admissible states to
those whose two-point functions 〈ξ|ϕ(x)ϕ(x′)|ξ〉 have the same singularity
structure as H(x, x′).
KRW’s result shows that in a neighborhood of a base point of a compactly
generated Cauchy horizon there is no way to consistently define a Hadamard
state. The set of base points B is defined as the set of points p which are past
terminal accumulation points for some null geodesic generator γ of H+(Σ)–
intuitively, γ continually re-enters any given neighborhood of the point p.49
(In the case of the Misner spacetime of the preceding section, every point of
H+(Σ) is a base point.) KRW prove that
Lemma: (a) When H+(Σ) is compactly generated, B 6= ∅. (b)
For any globally hyperbolic neighborhood U of a base point, there
are points y, z ∈ U ∩D+(Σ) such that y and z are connected by a
null geodesic in M, gab but cannot be connected by a null curve
lying entirely in U .
(The reader should verify property (b) for the case of Misner spacetime.)
Because of the clash between the local and global senses of null-related points
and because the singularity structure of a Hadamard state depends on which
points are null related, the point splitting procedure fails to yield a well-
defined value for 〈ξ|Tab|ξ〉 at a base point.50
It is expected that analogous results hold for cases where H+(Σ) is not
compactly generated but serves as a chronology horizon in the sense that it
separates the initially globally hyperbolic region D+(Σ) from a region where
there are CTCs (see Cramer and Kay 1996 and KRW 1997). The collection
49More precisely, a past terminal accumulation point of a curve γ : I → M, I ⊂ R, is
defined as a point p ∈ M such that for every open neighborhood N (p) and every s ∈ I,
∃(s′ ∈ I : s′ > s & γ(s′) ∈ N (p)], where γ is parametrized so as to be past directed. Since
the null geodesic generators of H+(Σ) are past inextendible, for every base point there is
a null curve which intersects any given neighborhood of that point more than once. Thus,
strong causality fails at each base point.
50The no-go result also relies on the propagation of singularities theorem which says,
very roughly, that singularities in a bi-solution to the Klein-Gordon field equation for
nearby points on a null geodesic are propagated along the entire geodesic.
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of such results promises to serve as a basis for a general chronology protection
theorem to the effect that the laws of physics prevent the formation of CTCs
in a spacetime initially free of causal anomalies, whether or not the formation
can be attributed to a time machine. But exactly how is this promise to be
realized? The original idea was that because the expectation value of the
stress-energy tensor “blows up” as the chronology horizon is approached,
backreaction effects shut down the incipient formation of CTCs. That idea,
to repeat, has been shot down by a number of counterexamples. The new
approach, while much more rigorous, is explanatorily less satisfying in that
it doesn’t provide a mechanism for preventing the formation of CTCs; rather
it proceeds by showing that, under such-and-such conditions, the formation
of CTCs is inconsistent with the applicability of SCQG, which requires that
expectation value of the stress-energy tensor be well-defined on H+(Σ). As
is often the case with reductio arguments, this reductio leaves the beholder
searching for the explanatory force.
Visser (1997, 2003) has argued that the situation is even worse because
the chronology horizon lies beyond the “reliability horizon,” which marks
the limit beyond which SCQG cannot be reliably applied. The “unreliable
region” Ω consists of points connected to themselves by spacelike geodesics
shorter than the Planck length (ca. 10−45m), and the reliability horizon is the
boundary of J+(Ω). The existence of these closed Planck scale loops spell
disaster for SCQG because the mode sum for a quantum field defined over
a region with such periodic spatial identifications will include momentum
terms on the order of the Planck energy. These energies and associated
metric fluctuations are great enough that we should not trust SCQG to give
an accurate rendering of backreaction effects.
The summing up of this section echoes that of the previous section: while
results from SCQG reveal problematic features of attempts to implement
time machines or, more generally, violations of chronology protection, they
do not add up to impossibility proofs.
6 No-go results from quantum field theory on
curved spacetime
If SCQG is a kind of first order approximation to full quantum gravity, then
quantum field theory (QFT) on curved spacetime is a 0th order approxima-
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tion: it has no ambition to compute backreaction effects; rather, a spacetime
of classical GTR is treated as a fixed background on which one attempts
to do QFT. There is a general recipe for cooking up a natural algebra of
observables A(M, gab) for a linear quantum field ϕ defined over a globally
hyperbolic spacetime M, gab (see Wald 1994). The result of this recipe is a
C∗-algebra generated by the elements representing “smeared” quantum fields
ϕ(f), where f belongs to a suitable “test function” space.51 This procedure
for constructing a QFT on curved spacetime breaks down for non-globally
hyperbolic spacetimes, and one can wonder whether it is even possible to
construct a decent QFT when the spacetime is so causally ill-behaved as
to contain CTCs and time machines. This opens the door for another ap-
proach to proving chronology protection theorems; namely, state and defend
as minimally necessary a condition that a spacetime must satisfy in order to
admit a decent QFT; then show that if a spacetime is initially free of CTCs,
it can develop CTCs only at the price of violating said minimally necessary
condition.
Kay (1992) has argued that a requirement he dubs F-quantum compatibil-
ity is just such a minimally necessary condition. To explain it, note first that
even if a spacetime M, gab fails to be globally hyperbolic, it is still possible
to choose for any p ∈ M a globally hyperbolic neighborhood U ⊂ M, i.e.
U , gab|U considered as a spacetime in its own right is globally hyperbolic. One
can then proceed per usual to construct the intrinsic algebra A(U , gab|U) for
this spacetime. But another possible choice of an algebra associated with U
is the algebra A(M, gab;U) induced on U by the global algebra A(M, gab).52
M, gab is said to satisfy F-locality with respect to a given A(M, gab) just in
case for every p ∈ M there is a globally hyperbolic neighborhood U such
that the algebras A(U , gab|U) and A(M, gab;U) are isomorphic. And M, gab
is said to be F-quantum compatible just in case it admits a global algebra
A(M, gab) with respect to which it is F-local.
In order to relate F-locality to chronology protection we need to be more
specific about how the algebras are constructed. Here we restrict attention to
a scalar quantum field ϕ satisfying the Klein-Gordon equation (g−m2)ϕ =
0, where g is the Laplace-Beltrami operator with respect to the metric gab
51E.g. C∞0 (M) (i.e. smooth functions with compact support on M). The smeared field
is defined by ϕ(f) :=
∫
M ϕ(x)f(x)η, where η is the volume element for the spacetime.
52A(M, gab;U) is the C∗-completion of the set of all A(M, gab)(O) for which the closure
of the open set O is contained in U , and A(M, gab)(O) is the subalgebra of A(M, gab)
generated by the smeared fields on M with f ∈ C∞0 (O).
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and m ≥ 0 is the mass of the field. When M, gab is globally hyperbolic,
A(M, gab) is taken to be the C∗-algebra of smeared quantum fields satisfying
the following conditions (KRW 1997):
1. ϕ(f) = ϕ(f)∗
2. ϕ(λ1f1 + λ2f2) = λ1ϕ(f1) + λ2ϕ(f2)
3. ϕ((g −m2)f) = 0
4. [ϕ(f1), ϕ(f2)] = i∆(f1, f2)
where ∆ is the advanced-minus-retarded fundamental solution to the Klein-
Gordon equation. The existence and uniqueness of ∆ is guaranteed for glob-
ally hyperbolic spacetimes. This guarantee fails when the spacetime is not
globally hyperbolic. Nevertheless one can construct for any globally hyper-
bolic neighborhood U the C∗-algebra of smeared fields such that condition
4 holds for f1, f2 ∈ C∞0 (U) with ∆ replaced by ∆|U , the advanced-minus-
retarded fundamental solution for U , gab|U .
Now consider a spacetime where H+(Σ) is compactly generated. We
know from the Lemma of the previous section that the set B ⊂ H+(Σ) of
base points is non-empty. Let U be any globally hyperbolic neighborhood of a
base point. Then the restrictions of A(U , gab|U) and of A(D+(Σ), gab|D+(Σ)) to
U∩D+(Σ) cannot coincide, as follows from the Lemma. It is a basic property
of ∆ that it vanishes for spacelike related points, whereas it is singular for null
related points. Thus, ∆|U and ∆|D+(Σ) cannot coincide when U is a globally
hyperbolic neighborhood of a base point. This shows that the usual field
algebra defined above for initially globally hyperbolic region D+(Σ) cannot
be extended in any way so as to satisfy F-locality on a compactly generated
H+(Σ). Under some extra mild technical assumptions KRW (1997) show
additionally that there is no field algebra at all that satisfies F-locality on
H+(Σ) when it is compactly generated.
In assessing the significance of these results for chronology protection, it
is worth noting that F-locality is not incompatible with time travel per se:
there are spacetimes that contain CTCs but are F-quantum compatible—
the spacetime of Fig. 1 being just such a case (see Kay 1992 and Fewster
and Higuchi 1996). But F-locality is incompatible with the development of
CTCs by means of a process that produces compactly generated H+(Σ) or,
more generally, a H+(Σ) containing base points with the property (b) of
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the Lemma. This is a chronology protection result, albeit of limited scope.
If Hawking’s condition of a compactly generated H+(Σ) were a necessary
condition for the operation of a time machine then the demonstrated incom-
patibility would be a completely general no-go result for time machines in
QFT on classical general relativistic spacetimes. But as we have seen, there
is reason to doubt that Hawking’s ansatz plays this role.
Apart from issues of scope, the main worry about the effectiveness of the
demonstrated incompatibility as a chronology protection theorem revolves
around the status of F-locality. Most directly, one can worry whether F-
locality constitutes a sine qua non for QFT. Krasnikov (1999) has argued
that a modified F-locality condition is perfectly compatible with the existence
of a compactly generated Cauchy horizon. If his argument is correct, then
the constraint on spacetime structure illustrated by the KRW results merely
indicate that the F-locality condition includes what Krasnikov calls an “arbi-
trary requirement” responsible for the non quantum compatibility of space-
times with compactly generated Cauchy horizons. As it stands, however,
Krasnikov’s modified F-locality condition is not an adequate replacement for
F-locality since it focuses on defining a field algebra over the union of globally
hyperbolic subsets of a manifold rather than over the entire manifold.53 This
leaves out precisely those parts of the manifold where F-locality is a substan-
tial requirement! Friedman (1997) has also suggested a weaker version of a
locality principle: instead of requiring that there is a global algebra which
satisfies the F-locality condition, he considers a set of local C∗-algebras with
suitable overlap conditions. However, Friedman’s considerations are limited
to strongly causal spacetimes, and it is not clear that extending his approach
to spacetimes with Cauchy horizons will lead to a condition weaker than F-
locality. Although this is a subject for further research, as of yet there is no
suitable replacement for F-locality which avoids the KRW result.
The results on the incompatibility of F-locality and the development of
53Krasnikov distinguishes globally hyperbolic subsets from intrinsically globally hyper-
bolic subsets: a subset N ⊂ M of a spacetime M, gab is globally hyperbolic iff (i)
∀p, q ∈ N , (J+(p)∩ J−(q)) ⊂ N and (ii) strong causality holds in N , whereas N is intrin-
sically globally hyperbolic iff N , gab|N is a globally hyperbolic spacetime. The difference
between the two lies in the importance of M−N : strong causality fails in N if a CTC
(or almost-CTC) loops through M− N and returns to N , but such a set will still be
intrinsically globally hyperbolic. The union of globally hyperbolic subsets excludes the
chronology violating regions, whereas the union of intrinsically globally hyperbolic subsets
can cover a chronology violating spacetime.
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CTCs does not furnish a mechanism that explains how Nature prevents the
formation of CTCs. Presumably that mechanism will have to come from the
full theory of quantum gravity of which QFT on curved spacetime is only a
0th order approximation. For sake of argument assume that the sought after
quantum theory of gravity has a semi-classical limit in which QFT on curved
spacetime emerges as the interaction between the quantized matter fields and
the metric is turned off. Why should one think that this limit will always
obey F-locality? Kay writes: “One also expects that, if full quantum gravity
satisfies a set of local laws, then some remnant of this locality would survive
at the semiclassical level and it seems worthwhile to anticipate what this
might be” (1992, 171-172). In the absence of even a dim view of the sought
after theory of quantum gravity it is not clear why the antecedent should be
realized, or why, if it is realized, the semi-classical limit of quantum gravity
will conform to F-locality. Still, there is an interesting implication to be
drawn from trying to suppose that F-locality fails. Suppose that we live in
a world that can be described by QFT on a curved spacetime of GTR, and
suppose further that this world contains a time machine whose operation
involves the existence of base points in H+(Σ). Then in principle we would
be able to detect the fact that we live in such a world by observing that
commutativity fails, [ϕ(f1), ϕ(f2)] 6= 0, even when the supports of f1 and f2
are relatively spacelike when viewed from within the local spacetime regions
we inhabit (see Kay 1997).
7 No-go results from Euclidean quantum grav-
ity
Cassidy and Hawking (1998) have argued that Euclidean methods provide a
“probabilistic” chronology protection result. The ambitions of the Euclidean
approach extend beyond those of either QFT on curved spacetimes or the
semi-classical approach: techniques borrowed from the path integral formu-
lation of QFT are used to study “full quantum gravity” effects, ranging from
the initial singularity to black hole evaporation.54 In QFT path integrals are
used to calculate the amplitude for a transition from one field configuration
54Our comments here about the Euclidean program will be brief; for a careful and thor-
ough assessment of the thorny interpretational issues, see Isham and Butterfield (1999).
For a collection of papers introducing the technical apparatus of the Euclidean approach,
see Gibbons and Hawking (1993).
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to another. These are often mathematically more well-behaved in Euclidean
space (obtained by replacing t with −it in global inertial coordinates) than
in Lorentz-signature spacetime, so field theorists frequently use Euclidean
path integrals and then analytically continue the relevant functions back to
Minkowski space to find S-matrix elements and the like. The Euclidean ap-
proach focuses on path integrals like those from QFT, such as that for gravity
coupled to a scalar field ϕ:55
Z(M) =
∫
dµ(gab)d(ϕ) exp(−SE[gab, ϕ]).
The analog of the “t→ −it” trick in curved space is to replace a Lorentzian
metric with a Riemannian metric; the path integral extends over the space
of all Riemannian metrics defined over the manifold M. In some cases
it is possible to analytically continue the Riemannian metric back into a
Lorentzian one to calculate physical quantities.
There are a number of difficulties in interpreting the quantity Z(M).
The tricks for handling the measure over field configurations in perturbative
calculations in QFT do not immediately extend to this case, and there is no
general definition for the measures dµ(gab) and d(ϕ). The interpretation of
the “wave function of the universe” Ψ[hij], a complex-valued functional on
the space of metrics hij defined on 3-dimensional manifolds, is contentious;
it is not clear whether Ψ[hij] can be interpreted as a “probability amplitude”
by analogy with QFT. Following the familiar Born rule, suppose we take∫
R |Ψ[hij]|2dµ(hij) to be the probability that the three-geometry of the uni-
verse falls within a range of values “R”. This “na¨ıve interpretation” faces a
number of obstacles.56 What does it mean to say that the universe has a given
three-geometry on a surface Σ, without specifying a time when this geometry
obtains? In addition, there is no guarantee that the dynamical evolution of Ψ
has properties that would make it possible to interpret these probabilities as
being somehow related to a curve through the space of allowed metrics. The
55The Euclidean action for general relativity coupled to a scalar field is given by
SE = − pi16
∫
M
R
√
g d4x+
pi
8
∫
∂M
K
√
h d3x−
∫
L(ϕ)
√
g d4x
where h := det(hij), hij being the spatial metric of the boundary ofM, written ∂M; K is
the trace of the extrinsic curvature of ∂M; and L(ϕ) is the Lagrangian of the scalar field.
56The term is borrowed from Unruh and Wald (1989), who also discuss the difficulties
with two other less na¨ıve attempts to introduce probabilities.
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Hartle-Hawking “no boundary” proposal interprets these probabilities as fol-
lows: define the ground state wave function(al) of the universe Ψ(hij, ϕ0,Σ)
as a sum of Z(M) ranging over compact Euclidean manifolds that have a
unique boundary Σ, with induced metric hij and field configuration ϕ0. The
probability calculated using this ground state is interpreted as the probabil-
ity for the Universe (with an initial spatial geometry Σ, hij) to “appear from
nothing” (Hartle and Hawking 1983).
The Euclidean approach is an initially promising way to study space-
times with CTCs since some of these spacetimes have well-behaved Euclidean
analytic continuations and the approach applies to non-globally hyperbolic
spacetimes. Cassidy and Hawking (1998) give a no-go result based on ap-
plying the Euclidean approach to a fixed background spacetime. In partic-
ular, they study scalar fields with finite temperature on background space-
times constructed as analytic continuations of periodic Euclidean spaces; i.e.,
flat Euclidean space with points identified under discrete isometries. These
spaces are equivalent to an Einstein universe rotating around some fixed
axis; as the rotation rate increases, at a critical value points sufficiently far
from the axis rotate faster than c. In the original space, the critical value
of the boost parameter corresponds to the formation of CTCs. The path
integral for the scalar field diverges to infinity at the critical value. At first
blush, this result seems to indicate that acausal spacetimes would be incred-
ibly probable according to the no boundary proposal. But an analogy with
thermodynamics suggests that a different quantity should be interpreted as
the true amplitude: Hawking and Cassidy calculate the entropy of the scalar
field, and interpret their result as implying that the density of quantum states
tends to zero. This result indicates that the quantum states that would be
associated with a chronology violation simply are not available.
Results along these lines could provide a broad basis for chronology pro-
tection. They extend more broadly than previous results, since they would
outlaw CTCs and not just time machines. But we have two reasons for
thinking that the case is not closed. The first relates to the vexed issue
of interpreting path integrals and associated probabilities in this setting.
We mentioned some of the difficulties associated with probabilities in the
Euclidean program above. Cassidy and Hawking’s (1998) introduction of
thermodynamic considerations muddies the waters further: Can their con-
siderations be consistently combined with assignments of probabilities based
on the no-boundary proposal, or do they come into play only in case of di-
vergences? Second, does every acausal spacetime have a Euclidean section?
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If the answer is no, as we conjecture, the Euclidean techniques do not apply
across the board. At best this approach would give a plausibility argument
that quantum effects prevent CTCs in spacetimes outside its domain of ap-
plicability.
8 Conclusion
The physics literature on time machines has evolved in the absence of any
precise delineation of the spacetime structure that would characterize the
operation of these devices. This seemingly scandalous situation is partly
explained by the combination of the facts that most of the physics literature
is aimed at producing no-go results and that most of the contributors to
the literature have accepted Hawking’s dictum that compactly generated
Cauchy horizons are a necessary feature of the operation of time machines.
Since this dictum is questionable, so are the effectiveness of the no-go results
based on it. But, to put a better face on the endeavor, what has become
known as the time machine literature in physics can be construed as an
investigation of the prospects of achieving no-go results showing that, under
physically reasonable conditions, CTCs cannot develop in spacetimes initially
free of these pathologies. Such chronology protection theorems, if sufficiently
general, would also constitute no-go results for time machines, however the
vagaries associated with such devices are settled. Our review indicates that
this sought after generality has not been achieved. At the same time, the
pursuit of chronology protection results has proved to be a fruitful way to
probe the foundations of classical GTR and the interface between general
relativity and quantum field theory.
Perhaps in the not too distant future it will be possible to discuss the
implications of a full quantum theory of gravity for time travel and time ma-
chines. But that day is not here. Of the two most promising approaches to
the sought after theory–loop quantum gravity (LQG) and string theory–the
former is closer to being able to claim the status of a definite theory.57 Pre-
liminary results indicate that LQG may be able to eliminate the spacetime
singularities that are generic among the solutions to Einstein’s field equa-
tions.58 Perhaps LQG will also eliminate CTCs; but in its present incarna-
tion LQG simply ignores chronology violations since it aims at producing
57For an overview, see Rovelli (2004).
58See, for example, Bojowald (2001), but see also Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006).
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quantum gravity by means of a canonical quantization of classical GTR, and
this quantization procedure is only applied to globally hyperbolic spacetimes.
Nevertheless, CTCs might emerge in the classical limit of LQG; but at the
present time this limit is poorly understood. Note also that LQG eliminates
classical general relativistic spacetime singularities not by replacing them
with non-singular classical spacetime but by showing that the classical sin-
gularity corresponds to a well-defined quantum state that, presumably, does
not legitimate the use of a classical spacetime description to any approxima-
tion. Eliminating CTCs and time machines as a byproduct of eliminating
classical relativistic spacetime structure may strike some (as it strikes us)
as less satisfying than a general chronology protection theorem for classical
GTR.
The study of time machines is a good opportunity for forging a partner-
ship between physics and the philosophy of physics. Of course, philosophers
have to recognize that in this particular instance the partnership is necessar-
ily an unequal one since the mathematical physicists have to do the heavy
lifting. But it also seems clear that a little more cooperation with philoso-
phers of science in attending to the analysis of what it takes to be a time
machine could have led to some helpful clarifications in the physics literature.
Finally, at the risk of repetition, we want to underscore two points that
have not penetrated very far into philosophical consciousness. The first is
that the physics literature on time machines engages a set of issues that are
largely distinct from those involved in the so-called paradoxes of time travel.
More attention to the former by philosophers could reinvigorate discussions
of the paradoxes and related issues. The second point is that chronology
protection theorems are sufficient but not necessary for showing that a time
machine cannot operate; so even if the loopholes in the presently existing
chronology protection theorems cannot be plugged, there remain other means
for showing that Nature does not sanction the operation of a time machine.
Our preferred means would be to show that the Potency Condition cannot
be realized in physically interesting models of GTR.
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